Synergy’s blog brings you the settlement services industry’s foremost thought leadership InSights on matters of healthcare lien resolution, Medicare Secondary Payer compliance, government benefit preservation, settlement consulting and attorney fee deferral. Visit often to discover helpful InSights on important areas of settlement-related compliance issues or subscribe to our Synergy InSights here.

Is it Workers’ Compensation or Liability?

July 21, 2022

Rasa Fumagalli, JD, MSCC, CMSP-F

Netflix’s new baking competition show “Is it Cake” challenges judges to identify which of two identical objects is edible and which is not. Attorneys settling cases involving work-related injuries may find themselves similarly perplexed when it comes to whether a work-related injury will be treated as a workers’ compensation or liability case for purposes of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (“MSP”). Depending on who the employer is at the time of a work-related injury, some injured employees may be covered by programs that are required under federal law. Depending on the nature of the program, the MSP compliance obligations will either be handled as a workers’ compensation or liability settlement.  For example, the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) that provides benefits for work-related injuries sustained by certain maritime and dock workers is viewed as workers’ compensation insurance when it comes to MSP compliance issues. On the other hand, the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) which provides benefits for railroad employees, who sustain injuries due to the negligence of a railroad carrier, is viewed as liability insurance when it comes to MSP compliance issues.  (See MSP Manual, Chapter 1, Section 10.4)

Both liability and workers’ compensation settlements are impacted by the MSP Act. The MSP is comprised of a series of statutory provisions intended to reduce federal health care costs. The MSP provides that if a primary payer exists, Medicare only pays for medical treatment relating to an injury to the extent that the primary payer does not pay. The MSP Act and supporting regulations specifically state that Medicare is precluded from making payments for services “to the extent that payment has been made or can reasonably be expected to be made promptly under any of the following (i) workers’ compensation; (ii)liability insurance; (iii) no-fault insurance. (42 U.S.C.§1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii), 42 C.F.R.§411.20 (a)(2)). A primary payer’s responsibility for payment may be demonstrated by “a judgment, payment conditioned upon the beneficiary’s compromise, waiver, or release (whether or not there is a determination or admission of liability) of payment for items or services included in a claim against the primary payer or the primary payer’s insured or by other means…” (42 C.F. R§411.22(b)). The parties first and foremost should ensure that pre-settlement injury-related payments (conditional payments) made by Medicare are reimbursed to the appropriate Medicare Trust Fund. In addition, and in light of the MSP, settlements that close out future injury-related medical benefits should avoid cost shifting the post-settlement injury-related care onto Medicare.

The MSP compliance distinction between a liability settlement and a workers compensation settlement is an important one since it may impact the way parties address post settlement injury related care. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) has issued a great deal of guidance when it comes to workers’ compensation settlements that close out future injury related medical. The Workers’ Compensation Medicare Set-Aside Arrangement (“WCMSA”) Reference Guide (“Guide”), Version 3.7, 6/6/2022, explains that parties should take Medicare’s interest, with respect to future medicals, into account by including a WCMSA into the settlement terms. The WCMSA should contain sufficient funds from the settlement to cover the total cost that will be incurred for future injury related Medicare covered treatment. CMS encourages parties to seek CMS approval of the proposed WCMSA when the settlement meets CMS’ internal workload review thresholds. The benefit to CMS’ review and approval of the proposed amount is the certainty in knowing that Medicare will become the primary payer for any injury-related services that exceed the properly exhausted CMS determined WCMSA. Although the Guide also states that CMS approval of a proposed WCMSA amount is not required, Section 4.3 notes that CMS may treat the use of non-CMS approved products as “a potential attempt to shift financial burden by improperly giving reasonable recognition to both medical expenses and income replacement.” Non-CMS approved products are MSA reports that are not submitted to CMS for review.

 If CMS concludes that there was an improper cost shift, it may deny payment for injury-related services until it is provided with attestation of appropriate exhaustion equal to the total settlement, less procurement costs and paid conditional payments.  The parties may overcome this denial by showing   CMS, at the time of the WCMSA exhaustion, that both the initial funding of the MSA was appropriate and the funds were used properly.

To understand the importance of the differences between whether a work injury is treated as workers’ compensation versus liability case in the context of the MSP, consider a FELA settlement.  FELA is treated as a liability settlement for purposes of the MSP due to its differences from the typical workers’ compensation case.  Although a FELA settlement involves a work-related injury, the railroad employee must show that his/her injuries were, due in whole or in part, to the negligence of the railroad. This burden of proof is different than the burden of proof in a typical workers’ compensation case. In most jurisdictions, for a workers’ compensation case, a worker must only show that he suffered an accidental injury, which arose out of and in the course of his employment.  There is no need to show negligence. 

Once a settlement agreement is reached in a FELA case, the parties should consider the potential impact of the MSP Act on the settlement. If the railroad employee is a Medicare beneficiary at time of settlement, Medicare will be given notice of the settlement under Section 111’s Mandatory Insurer Reporting obligation. The notice of settlement may result in the potential risk of Medicare denying post-settlement injury-related care. If the railroad employee has completed his injury-related treatment and no further treatment is indicated, the beneficiary may wish to obtain a written certification from the treating physician to that effect. Pursuant to CMS’ 9/30/2011 Memo, there is no need for a liability MSA when the treating physician makes this certification.  

If, however, the beneficiary continues to treat for his injuries, or will need future injury-related care, an MSA might be considered to avoid any potential issues with Medicare denying post-settlement injury-related care.  While a workers’ compensation settlement will usually fully fund the WCMSA, the liability MSA may at times consider the relative value of each of the elements of damage being compensated in the settlement (pro-rata apportionment).  This apportionment approach considers the ratio between the total potential case value and the net settlement. Parties may also choose to fully fund the liability MSA. The decision of how much, or how little, risk to assume when it comes to post-settlement injury-related care is one that should be made by the beneficiary and documented in the attorney’s file.

Conditional payments, payments made by Medicare for injury-related care provided prior to settlement, must also be addressed in connection with a settlement. In a workers’ compensation case, conditional payment recovery is handled by the Commercial Repayment Center (“CRC”). The CRC seeks to pursue recovery directly from the workers’ compensation insurer carrier while the case is open. Once the case settles, the conditional payment recovery will move from the CRC to the Benefits Coordination and Recovery Center (“BCRC”) since the beneficiary is now the identified debtor. Since a FELA settlement is viewed as a liability settlement, the BCRC will handle the conditional payment recovery and seek recovery from the beneficiary debtor. Payments made by a Medicare Advantage Plan (“MAP”) must also be addressed. Information regarding the MAP payments is provided by the relevant insurance carrier themselves and not the BCRC/CRC.

While one work injury case may look just like any other, your MSP compliance approach may depend on whether CMS views the case as liability or workers’ compensation.  A thorough understanding of the differences and risks of various approaches is necessary in order to avoid any unexpected consequences of inaction.

Contact Synergy Settlement Services to discuss the way our MSP compliance team may assist you.

In episode 28 of Trial Lawyer view, host and Synergy CEO, Jason D. Lazarus, J.D., LL.M., CSSC, MSCC  had an engaging conversation with female powerhouse trial lawyer, Margaret P. Battersby Black from Levin & Perconti Attorneys at Law. They discussed her specialty in nursing home cases and the impact the case of Grauer V. Claire Oaks made on the Illinois Nursing Home Care Act. In addition, they talked about her transition from a successful business finance career to becoming a trial lawyer along with the challenges she had encountered by being a female trial lawyer.

Learn more here.

Jason D. Lazarus, J.D., LL.M., CSSC, MSCC

June 9, 2022

On June 6th, 2022, the United States Supreme Court decided in a 7-2 decision to allow Florida Medicaid, pursuant to Section 409.910 of the Florida Statutes, to recover its lien from all medical damages past and future.  This decision has nothing to do with future eligibility for Medicaid post settlement, that is still protected by special needs trusts, instead, it allows a state Medicaid agency to pursue its lien against all medical damages in the case.  This is a departure from the dictates of Ahlborn which protected a Medicaid recipients’ property right in their settlement as dictated by the federal anti-lien provisions. 

Gallardo argued that the anti-lien provisions in the Medicaid Act prohibited Florida Medicaid from attempting to recover its lien from anything other than the amounts properly allocable to past medical expenses.  The Supreme Court held otherwise finding that it falls within an exception to the anti-lien provisions that served as the pillars of the Ahlborn decision.  Further, the court held that the assignment provisions in the Medicaid Act requires a Medicaid beneficiary, as a condition of eligibility, to assign all rights to payments for medical care from a third party back to the state Medicaid agency.  And states must enact recovery provisions that allow for the state to recover from liability third parties when a Medicaid beneficiary is injured, and Medicaid pays for that care.  While the court upheld the property right and anti-lien prohibitions against recovery from non-medical damages, it held it didn’t protect damages that were for medical care. 

The bottom line of the holding is as follows:

“Under §1396k(a)(1)(A), Florida may seek reimbursement from settlement amounts representing “payment for medical care,” past or future. Thus, because Florida’s assignment statute “is expressly authorized by the terms of . . . [§]1396k(a),” it falls squarely within the “exception to the anti-lien provision” that this Court has recognized. Ahlborn, 547 U. S., at 284.”

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Gallardo is right on point about the inequity of the majority’s opinion related to Medicaid liens and from what elements of damages a state agency can recover from: “It holds that States may reimburse themselves for medical care furnished on behalf of a beneficiary not only from the portions of the beneficiary’s settlement representing compensation for Medicaid-furnished care, but also from settlement funds that compensate the Medicaid beneficiary for future medical care for which Medicaid has not paid and might never pay. The Court does so by reading one statutory provision in isolation while giving short shrift to the statutory context, the relationships between the provisions at issue, and the framework set forth in precedent. The Court’s holding is inconsistent with the structure of the Medicaid program and will cause needless unfairness and disruption.”  Justice Sotomayor also recognized that due to the majority’s ruling, many injury victims would have less dollars from their settlement to place into federally-authorized special needs trusts that protect their ability to pay for important expenses Medicaid will not cover.  This is exactly what had been done for the benefit of Gallardo when her case was settled but now she will have less go into that trust since more money will have to go to reimburse Florida Medicaid. 

So, what does Gallardo mean for injury victims? A state Medicaid agency or its recovery contractor can now take the position that the recovery right applies to past and future medicals so when you do an Ahlborn analysis, it would be the appropriate reduction percentage (using a pro-rata formula) applied to the entire value of medical damages to see if there is a reduction in the lien. Pre-Gallardo, some states were already taking that position as well as some recovery contractors. From a practical perspective, in cases with a large life care plan or a lot of future medicals, there may not be a reduction at all in the lien. It is going to be important that the non-economic damages get properly valued with some multiplier times specials to make strong arguments for a reduction. 

In the end, Medicaid beneficiaries will not net out as much from their settlements as they should. Some cases may not be brought, and more injury victims will wind up quickly back on Medicaid post recovery. It is an unfortunate end result and just bad law.

To read the full opinion, click HERE

This decision doesn’t mean though all is lost, but you need experts to help you navigate through the lien resolution minefield. Contact Synergy to help find your way to the best outcome for your client.

To read a whitepaper for a summary of the law pre-Gallardo, click HERE.

June 9, 2022 

Michael Walrath, Esq.

The “reasonable value” of healthcare is an issue that weaves throughout our entire system. Even so, there’s no concrete definition of what exactly is “reasonable value”. Dr. Gerard Anderson of Johns Hopkins University School of Public Health has defined it as 40% to 45% above the cost of care[1]. No-fault insurance statutes in many states define reasonable value in their fee schedules for accident care.[2] Certain TPA’s managing employer-based health plans peg reimbursement at a “reasonable value” defined as a stated percentage above Medicare rates in their plans (often called “Reference Based Pricing” or “RBP Plans”).[3]  Meanwhile, hospital systems and the largest insurers enter into complex Provider Agreements, agreeing in advance to what both parties agree is reasonable reimbursement for hundreds of millions of covered lives in the United States.

Reasonable value of health care also appears, in personal injury actions as evidence of medical special damages caused by a tortfeasor, but under a slightly different definition. The definition of “reasonable medical damages” (the amount owed by a tortfeasor for the medical specials incurred by his or her victim) is arguably distinguishable from the amount owed to a hospital, by a patient. While a certain nexus does obviously exist, other evidentiary issues and considerations exist in tort cases, which do not exist in the simpler, more direct “payer-provider disputes” which are more akin to the hospital lien scenario.   

All States and even Hospitals, are Different

The legal framework around hospital liens is set by statutes and case law interpreting them and varies widely from state to state. Forty states, and the District of Columbia, have enacted hospital lien statues.[4] Because all states are so very different, you must follow the law and the facts of your case, when determining whether a hospital lien is attached to an injury settlement, and in developing the best strategy for reducing hospital liens and debts.

For example, California hospitals enjoy liens against injury recoveries by statute (§3045), which are limited to the lesser of “reasonable hospital charges” or 50% of a limited recovery. The burden is on the hospital to prove the “reasonableness” of its charges when seeking interpleaded funds. Not surprisingly, California law is largely consumer-friendly, in this regard, holding “[t]he full amount billed by medical providers is not an accurate measure of the value of medical services because many patients pay discounted rates, and standard rates for a given service can vary tremendously, sometimes by a factor of five or more, from hospital to hospital in California.” Therefore, the statute requires “that the charges for such services were reasonable.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Huff, 216 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1464 (2013). Conversely, Ohio is one of the nine states with no statewide lien statute, but the common law is similarly friendly, holding that “[i]t is a settled general rule that a physician or surgeon is, in the absence of an agreement as to the amount of his compensation, entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services. Miami Valley Hosp. v. Middleton, 2011-Ohio-5069, ¶ 1 (Ct. App.); however, the case goes on to cite Supreme Court authority suggesting “customary charges” (i.e., full billed charges) are prima facia evidence of reasonable value absent evidence to the contrary.  

Another example of state law diversity can be found in Florida. Florida hospital liens are a creature of County Ordinance, with only nine of the state’s sixty-seven counties enjoying valid, ordinal lien rights. This is after many counties lost their rights pursuant to the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion in Shands v Mercury[5] which struck down as unconstitutional, all county lien laws created by Special Act of the Florida Legislature, . Consequently, many Florida hospitals (and indeed hospitals in many other states) have elected to simply create hospital liens against third party recoveries, by contract.

Another state with no statewide lien statute is Pennsylvania. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has held:

Where, as here, there is no express agreement to pay, the law implies a promise to pay a reasonable fee for a health provider’s services. Eagle v. Snyder, 412 Pa. Super. 557, 604 A.2d 253 (Pa. Super. 1992). Thus, in a situation such as this, the defendant should pay for what the services are ordinarily worth in the community. Id. Services are worth what people ordinarily pay for them… Under the law, the Hospital is entitled to the reasonable value of its services, i.e., what people pay for those services, not what the Hospital receives in one to three percent of its cases. Accordingly, the damage award in this unjust enrichment action simply is unwarranted. In light of the applicable law, the Hospital should be awarded its average collection rate for each year in question. This value would be reasonable. 

Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 2003 PA Super 332, ¶¶ 26-27, 832 A.2d 501, 508 – 509.

As a final example of lien law diversity, I turn to Maryland and Virginia. Maryland does have a lien statute which limits liens to reasonable charges, but Maryland is the last of the “all payer” states. Accordingly, in simplified terms, all Maryland patients pay essentially the same amount whether insured, on Medicare, or self-pay Hospital charges in Maryland are vetted and approved by a State Commission, making “reasonable value” arguments nearly impossible. Virginia actually has two different hospital lien statues; one for hospitals operated by the Commonwealth, and a second for all other hospitals. Commonwealth hospital liens are not limited to “reasonable charges” in the main section of the statute, but enforcement provisions limit collection to “reasonable charges.” So arguably, reasonableness is required. Unfortunately, the Attorney General’s Office, who collects upon Commonwealth liens in Virginia, does not agree and insists on full billed charges unless an equitable distribution of a limited settlement is required.

As these diverse examples illustrate, it is critically important to follow the law and facts of your case, in the hospital’s jurisdiction, when it comes to determining the validity of a lien against a given recovery, and the legal definition/interpretation of “reasonable value.”

Reduction Strategies – What IS “Reasonable Value,” Anyway?

Over the past fifteen years, I have worked with and presented to hundreds of lawyers and law firms, in Florida and more recently, nationwide. Despite the previously explored legal diversity regarding the validity of liens and the common-law interpretation of reasonable value, lawyers tend to approach hospital lien negotiations in a surprisingly similar way.  This is basically, a “blind” negotiation of the amount allegedly due, seeking a “discount” from full billed charges. Both sides, unfortunately, frame reductions as “discounts,” as if full billed charges are owed merely because the hospital wrote them on the lien. If nothing else, this semantic misstep sets the wrong tone, and hands all the negotiation leverage to the hospital. Under the statutes, ordinances, and the common law of all but a few states, the true power paradigm is the exact opposite. Patients and their attorneys have the money, and the law expressly limits hospitals to “reasonable charges” and saddles the hospital with the burden of proof. The only proof of reasonableness a hospital can ever muster is that they charge everyone the same rates. However, as we know, less than a few percent of patients pay those amounts and overcharging everyone equally isn’t evidence of reasonableness, anyway. Shockingly, personal injury attorneys allow themselves to be lumped in with those few percent and request “discounts” as if the hospitals are granting favors. Simply put, reframe the negotiation; put you and your client properly in the driver’s seat where you belong.

I start most presentations by asking injury firms what their average reductions are. The typical, average responses are, 1) we never accept less than a 20% discount, 2) a thirty percent discount is about average, and 3) a forty percent discount is a homerun, and we’ll recommend accepting it. Understandably, many clients are indeed happy with a 40% reduction in the amount initially shown on the Closing Statement, especially on large billsas that reduction can be a substantial amount of money. And for the avoidance of doubt, these are average results from years of questions, this is normal so if they sound familiar, that is not a bad thing. However, I do want to share why and how there are deeper reductions available.

“Inverting the Argument”

The answer is simple in theory, a bit more complex in practice. Theoretically, reduction results (notice I do not call them “discounts”) are better when you negotiate “up” from reasonable value of care that is due and owing under most state law, rather than down from the unilateral, arbitrary, and unreasonable full billed charges which nobody ever pays.  

In practice, this theoretical shift requires definition and calculation of the reasonable value of the care rendered. While more complex than simply proceeding with negotiations without any data at all, defining reasonable value and calculating it are not impossible. Case law in most states, and leading hospital billing experts suggest that the “cost” of treating patients, is a reasonable benchmark. Accordingly, a workable definition of reasonable value, and in my opinion the easiest definition of “reasonable value” for Judges and lay-people alike to understand, is “cost of care plus a reasonable profit.” And thankfully, cost of care in the hospital setting is calculable.

Every hospital which accepts Medicare patients (which, because hospitals must treat everyone seeking emergency care, effectively means every hospital in the US) submits, annually, a Hospital Cost Report (CMS Form 2552-210). These Reports contain data detailing the costs incurred and charges billed by every department and can be used to estimate the “cost of care” of any given line item of service on any hospital bill. What is the reasonable value of a CT Scan at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami? If the total revenue data and total cost data from JMH’s annual Hospital Cost Report are merged for the CT Scan department, a “cost to charge” ratio can be derived and applied to the charges for any single scan, yielding an estimated and defensible “cost of care,” and then, “reasonable value.” This methodology is used by experts not only in testimony before Congress, but also in studies published in highly respected healthcare journals like HEALTH AFFAIRS[6]. Reports can be obtained:

  • From CMS via FOIA Request (or searched via various online cms.gov websites/portals)
  • From hospitals directly by subpoena or in discovery (if litigating the hospital lien)
  • From various data vendors online (just google “hospital cost report”)

SYNERGY SETTLEMENT SERVICES uses its proprietary database and algorithm to quickly calculate “cost of care” and “reasonable value” of any hospital bill and uses that analysis to negotiate up from reasonable value, nationwide.

The Lien/Debt Dichotomy

There is a critical difference between a lien and a debt, which dictates not only best practices in reducing/resolving liens, but also the legal and ethical exposure associated with the same. Liens can ONLY be created by statute/ordinance, or by agreement/contract; whereas debts exist whenever a patient has received care which has not been paid for (even if there is no injury case or recovery at all). A “LIEN” is a legal interest in the proceeds being held in Trust; it is merely a security interest in the proceeds (not a legal right to collect money from a patient). Think of a mortgage. When a homeowner borrows money to buy a house, she or he owes a debt to the bank, but the bank also creates a mortgage which attaches that debt to the real property, as security. The bank could loan someone money to buy a house without creating a mortgage, and the person would still owe the bank the same amount as if there was a mortgage. The only difference is the person could sell the house and pay nothing to the bank from the proceeds of that sale. The same is true of hospital debts and liens.

Accordingly, it is important to determine whether a medical bill/account is a LIEN, or a mere DEBT, and if a lien, whether its contractual or statutory, before engaging in negotiations. The steps you take for resolving a lien are different than the steps you take for resolving a debt.

If there is a valid lien against the proceeds, review the language of the statute or contract creating the legal interest in the settlement proceeds (lien). Next, estimate the “reasonable value,” and calculate the “equitable distribution” amount (provider’s pro-rata portion of an equitable share of the settlement – usually 1/3 of settlement, or 50% of NET). Then lastly, negotiate for the better/lower of “equitable amount” or “reasonable value.” And remember, many lien statutes and some contractual liens obviate or codify “equitable distribution” formulae – always follow the applicable law/language.

If there is not a valid lien against the proceeds, the best strategies to employ are different. First, I strongly recommend obtaining written confirmation that the provider is not pursuing a lien against the client’s settlement. Next, determine if your client even wants to resolve the “mere debt” from the settlement proceeds (remember, you have no ethical responsibilities towards ordinary creditors). If not, you may disburse proceeds upon demand, but I do recommend obtaining signed acknowledgment of the debt, from your client. Only if your client does wish to resolve the debt from her or his proceeds (which I recommend you advocate for), should you negotiate for reasonable value or an equitable reduction. But importantly, note that absent an agreement otherwise, equitable reduction merely resolves liens, as a matter of law. Accordingly, be sure to include language that the provider agrees to accept the equitable amount as “payment in full,” to release all debt.

Responsibility to “Discover” Liens?

Generally, it is a lienholder’s responsibility to put you on notice of their lien. However, Ethics Committees often impute some level of due diligence onto Injury Attorneys in these, as in most other, circumstances. To minimize exposure, I always recommend Injury Attorneys ask all known medical providers if they are pursuing lien rights and if so, to provide documentation of the same. If providers confirm they are not pursuing a lien, it is up to the client whether to pay from proceeds, or not. If a provider confirms they are pursuing lien rights (and provide evidence of such rights in the way of a properly filed HOSPITAL CLAIM OF LIEN or a contractual lien signed by the client), you must hold the encumbered proceeds in Trust and either negotiate a release or adjudicate the lien, if negotiations impasse. And lastly, if a provider refuses to respond or refuses to provide documentary evidence of their lien, I recommend sending several written requests, including deadlines for provision of evidence of a lien and a date for distribution. As a rule of thumb, the more evidence of your due diligence, the better. So, I typically conclude my efforts with a NOTICE OF WAIVER OF LIEN RIGHTS, advising again that any alleged rights will be waived, and monies will be disbursed, on a specific date.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is ultimately YOUR responsibility to determine if a medical bill is a “lien” or a mere “debt.” Liens are third-party “security interests” in the money you are holding in Trust; you must protect them, and you may not be the “sole arbiter” of a lien dispute. If lien amounts are not agreed in advance of care being rendered, your client owes only the “reasonable value” of the care they received. And that “Reasonable Value” is most easily defined and calculated as the “Cost of Care” plus a “Reasonable Profit.” And finally, always remember that SYNERGY SETTLEMENT SERVICES compliantly negotiates hospital and provider liens nationwide, so you don’t have to spend the time doing so. We are your strategic partner, ensuring you avoid all the many ethical and legal pitfalls of hospital lien resolution, while efficiently reducing hospital liens to an objectively reasonable amount,  protecting your clients’ well deserved and hard-earned recoveries.   

[1] GERARD F. ANDERSON, PhD is a professor of health policy and management and professor of international health at the Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School Public Health, professor of medicine at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Hospital Finance and Management. His work encompasses studies of chronic conditions, comparative insurance systems in developing countries, medical education, health care payment reform, and technology diffusion. He has directed reviews of health systems for the World Bank and USAID in multiple countries. He has authored two books on health care payment policy, published over 250 peer reviewed articles, testified in Congress over 40 times as an individual witness, and serves on multiple editorial committees. Prior to his arrival at Johns Hopkins, Dr. Anderson held various positions in the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, where he helped to develop Medicare prospective payment legislation. See https://publichealth.jhu.edu/faculty/11/gerard-anderson

[2] In Florida for example, reasonable charges for non-emergency room care are defined as 200% Medicare, while the reasonable value of care rendered in the Emergency Room is 75% of the hospital’s billed charges.

[3] See American Hospital Association, Fact Sheet: Reference Based Pricing at https://www.aha.org/fact-sheets/2021-06-08-fact-sheet-reference-based-pricing.

[4] Ala. Code § 35-11-370; Alaska Stat. § 34.35.450; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-931; Ark. Code Ann. § 18-46-101; Cal. Civ. Code § 3045.1; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-27-101; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 49-73; Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 4301; D.C. Code § 40-201; Ga. Code Ann. § 44-14-470; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 507-4; Idaho Code Ann. § 45-701; 770 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 23/1; Ind. Code Ann. § 32-33-4-1; Iowa Code Ann. § 582; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-406; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:4751; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 10, § 3411; Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 16-601; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 111, § 70a; Minn. Stat. § 514.68; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 430.230; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§52-401 & 52-402; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 108.590; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 448-A:1; N.J. Stat. Ann § 2a:44-35; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 48-8-1; N.Y. Lien Law § 189; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 44-49; N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 35-18-01; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 42 §§43 & 44; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 87.555; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann.§§9-3-4 to 9-3-8; S.D. Codified Laws § 44-12-1; Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-22-101; Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 55.001; Utah Code Ann. § 38-7-1; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 2253; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-66.2; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 60.44.010; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 779.80

[5] “The Alachua County Lien Law, ch. 88-539, Laws of Fla., is a special law which creates a lien based on a private contract between a hospital and its patient, and is thus unconstitutional under Art. III, § 11(a)(9), Fla. Const.”
Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics v. Mercury Ins. Co., 97 So. 3d 204, 207 (Fla. 2012)

[6] See Extreme Markup: The Fifty US Hospitals With The Highest Charge-To-Cost Ratios https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2014.1414

May 5, 2022

The following communication is in response to press release 2022-76 published by the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 2nd, 2022. Synergy Settlement Services, Inc. (SSS), its principals and the Foundation for Those with Special Needs (“Foundation”) are disappointed that the Securities and Exchange Commission has opted to file a lawsuit as outlined in the press release.

We strongly believe this Government action is unwarranted under the law and facts, we adamantly deny that any trust beneficiary or retained funds were improperly used and intend to vigorously defend this case in Court.

The SEC’s press release used salacious terms like “beach parties” and “golf tournaments” to describe events held by outside non-profits but seemingly insinuated that the events were thrown by Synergy. While those terms may help generate media headlines, it’s just not accurate.  As an example, the alleged “beach parties” thrown by Synergy is actually referencing a contribution by The Foundation to a state “Civil Justice Foundation” that is a 501(c)(3).  The mission of this organization, like others The Foundation has supported over the years, is to keep the civil justice system accessible.

Since its inception, The Foundation has donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to a variety of non-profit organizations doing incredible charitable work across the country.

Rest assured that as we work through the process of exonerating ourselves, we remain 100% committed to serving our clients and the families you fight for.  This will not impact our operations or results.  We remain steadfast in our dedication to the work of improving the lives of injury victims.

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